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Recent Developments

STATEv. SNOWDEN:
Hearsay Statements Made by Child Abuse Victims to a Social
Worker May Not Be Admitted at a Criminal Trial Through the
Social Worker under Maryland's "Tender Years" Statute
By: Erica C. Mudd
In light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held certain hearsay statements may not be admitted at a
criminal trial through a social worker's testimony under MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001). State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64,
68, 867 A.2d 314, 316 (2005). In affirming the intermediate appellate
court's decision, the Court found statements made by child abuse
victims to a social worker were improperly admitted through the social
worker in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, as the statements were testimonial in nature and the
declarants were available to testify. !d. at 74, 867 A.2d at 319.
In late January 2002, three girls between the ages of eight and
ten-years-old accused Michael Conway Snowden ("Snowden") of
inappropriate touching.
Snowden denied the girls' allegations,
although police were contacted and a joint investigation by the
Montgomery County Police Department and Child Protective Services
for Montgomery County ensued.
As part of that investigation, the girls were separately
interviewed by Montgomery County Department of Health and Human
Services sexual abuse investigator, Amira Abdul-Wakeel ("Wakeel").
At the beginning of each interview, the girls expressed awareness that
the interviews were being conducted as a result of the accusations
made against Snowden. Subsequent to the interviews, Snowden was
arrested on a warrant issued upon information obtained by Wakeel
during her interviews with the girls.
Snowden was indicted on one count of child abuse and six
counts of third-degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, the State filed a
motion to invoke Maryland's "tender years" statute, codified at MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001). That statute allows the
State to substitute a health or social work professional's testimony in
place of a child's where the court determines the child's statements
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possesses "specific guarantees oftrustworthiness." !d. at 73, 867 A.2d
at 319.
In accordance with the statute's framework, the trial judge
examined the girls and ruled that Wakeel's testimony of their accounts
satisfied the requirements necessary to invoke the statute. The girls
were permitted to depart, and their accounts of abuse were admitted
into evidence through Wakeel.
Based largely on Wakeel's testimony, Snowden was found
guilty on all counts following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County. He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which held, in light of the recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
that (1) Wakeel's testimony violated Snowden's right to confrontation,
as the girls were available to testify, and (2) the girls' interview
statements to Wakeel were sufficiently testimonial in nature. !d. at 74,
867 A.2d at 319 (citing Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 157, 846
A.2d 36, 47 (2004)).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to
consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding the
introduction of hearsay evidence, pursuant to MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 11-304, violated Snowden's right to confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution in light of
Crawford v. Washington. !d. at 74, 867 A.2d 319-20.
The Court began its analysis with brief explanations of the
Confrontation Clause ("Clause") and Maryland's "tender years"
statute. !d. at 75, 867 A.2d at 320. The Court explained that the
Clause, which provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him," falls short of proclaiming a defendant's right to confront his
accuser face-to-face at trial absolute. !d. at 75, 867 A.2d at 320 (citing
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 863 (1990) (holding the Clause is not
violated when the State presents the testimony of a child victim by
way of closed circuit television)). The Court further explained, by
way of the United States Supreme Court holding in Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), this less-than-absolute right allows the admission
of hearsay statements in a criminal trial when the declarant is
unavailable and the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability."
!d. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
According to the Court, subsequent to the establishment of the
Roberts "indicia of reliability" standard, many states, including
Maryland, enacted statutes permitting the admission of certain hearsay
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statements in criminal trials. !d. The Maryland "tender years" statute,
first codified in 1988, is among this group, and was designed to ensure
the adequate prosecution of child abuse and sexual offense crimes.
See !d. at 75-76, 867 A.2d 320-21. To comport with Roberts, the
statute requires the out-of-court statement to possess "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." !d. at 76, 867 A.2d 321 (quoting MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2001)).
As the Court of Appeals aptly recognized, however, the
Crawford decision has fundamentally altered Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. !d. at 78, 867 A.2d 322. Specifically, the Crawford
Court held the introduction of a defendant's wife's tape-recorded
statements at trial violated the defendant's right to confrontation. !d.
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36). That decision effectively overruled
the Roberts "indicia of reliability" standard. !d. at 79, 867 A.2d at
322. In doing so, the Crawford Court determined the Roberts standard
thwarted both the Framer's goal and vision of the Clause: insuring
reliability of evidence. !d. Thus, the Crawford Court set forth a new
test, that the "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness may be
offered into evidence at a criminal trial only when the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. !d.
Although failing to define "testimonial," the Crawford Court
enumerated characteristics of testimonial statements. !d. at 80, 867
A.2d at 323. The Crawford Court explained, such statements share a
common nucleus in that each involves a formal or official statement
made or elicited for the purpose of being introduced at a criminal trial.
!d. at 81, 867 A.2d at 324. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36). The Court
of Appeals interpreted this to mean that when a statement is made in
the course of a criminal investigation initiated by the government, the
Clause forbids its introduction unless the defendant had prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. !d.
Applying the objective standards of Crawford to the instant
case, the Court of Appeals explained, an ordinary person in the girls'
positions would have anticipated that statements made to a sexual
abuse investigator would be used in a subsequent prosecution. !d. at
84, 867 A.2d at 325. As such, the Court determined that the
interviews with Wakeel were the functional equivalent of formal
police questioning, and therefore, the girls' statements were
testimonial in nature. !d.
In support of this determination, the Court pointed to the
interviews being conducted as part of a formal police investigation, the
presence of law enforcement during the interviews, and the girls'
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awareness of the interview(s) purpose. Id. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 32526. Further, the Court found Wakeel's role as an interviewer akin to a
police officer in a routine police interrogation, likening her to an agent
of the police department. Id. at 86, 867 A.2d 326-27. Moreover, the
Court reasoned that even if the statements were made for the sole
purpose of satisfying the requirements of the tender years statute, they
remained testimonial in nature. ld. at 85, 867 A.2d 326.
Although the Court of Appeals recognized potential situations
where a child is too young or immature to understand the testimonial
nature of his or her statements, it concluded young children's
statements can possess the same testimonial nature as those of other
more competent declarants. Id. 89, 867 A.2d 328-29. In that regard,
the Court declared the appropriate test for determining whether a
statement is testimonial in nature is based on an objective person, not
that of an objective child of similar age. !d. at 90-91, 867 A.2d at 329.
While sympathizing with public policy concerns aimed at
limiting child victims' exposures to potentially traumatizing courtroom
experiences, the Court expressed it, "must be faithful to the
Constitution's deep concern for the fundamental rights of the
accused." Id. at 90, 867 A.2d at 829. The Court clearly noted,
however, that the holding in this case does not render Maryland's
tender years statute useless. Id. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. The Court
explained that the statutory framework certainly contemplates other
circumstances in which a child's non-testimonial statements could be
supplied constitutionally by a health or social work professional. ld.
Further, the court was silent as to whether non-investigatory
statements could be admissible in light of Crawford. Id.
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Snowden clearly stands for
the proposition that preserving the fundamental rights of the criminally
accused is of preeminent importance. The opinion, however, is not
without bittersweet undertones. Protecting child sexual abuse victims
and preserving their accounts of abuse is hardly a peripheral concern.
While the Court carefully crafted its opinion with the intent of
preserving Maryland's tender years statute, the law appears to be destabilized. As such, future prosecutorial invocation of MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 will likely pose a sizable challenge.
Nevertheless, whether a proponent of defendants' or victims' rights,
the future of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, especially as it
relates to the tender years statute, will be worth tracking.
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